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Being an axclave, the Kaliningrad re-
gion has been drawing attention of many 
researchers in different fields. Yet the pros-
pects for cooperation between the region 
and neighbouring communities in Poland 
and Lithuania, which once constituted an 
integrated social, economic and political 
space, remain unclear. Media analysts and 
scholars alike tend to view the Kaliningrad 
region as “double periphery”, since it is ex-
cluded from major modernisation processes 
both in the European integration zone and 
in the Russian Federation. However, a de-
tailed study involving polyscale socioeco-
nomic indices, expert interviews, and sur-
veys run contrary to this viewpoint. A look at 
the key indices of the Kaliningrad region 
and the neighbouring communities of Po-
land and Lithuania showed that both socio-
economic situation and standards of living 
are comparable in these areas, which indi-
cates the prerequisites for mutually benefi-
cial interregional cooperation. We have 
analysed factual information on socioeco-
nomic development of cross-border regions 
and surveyed the students from the leading 
universities of Gdansk, Kaliningrad and 
Klaipeda. We were thus able to conclude 
that the reasons behind the delapidated 
cross-border relations are rather subjective 
and lie in the field of geopolitical orienta-
tion, information and institutional policy, as 
well as persistent stereotypes that shape 
public opinion. In this light, integration be-
tween the Kaliningrad region and mainland 
Russia is seen not only as an economic, but 
also as a sociocultural objective. An analy-
sis of the stages of the region’s exclavisa-
tion, and policies of social support stemming 
from the uniqueness of the economic and 
geographical position of the region substan-
tiate this conclusion. 
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and geographical position (EGP) of the 
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ture. E. Yu. Vinokurov’s research [12] suggests that, today, the Kaliningrad 
region is both a Russian exclave (in relation to Poland and Lithuania) and a 
semi-enclave of the European Union. The analysis of works focusing on the 
features of the region’s EGP [14; 31; 37] shows that the exclavity of the Ka-
liningrad region was developing gradually. One can identify two major 
stages of the region’s exclavisation. 
The first stage (1990s) is connected to the process of state building in 
Lithuania and Belarus. The emergence of actual barriers as a result of the in-
troduction of border and customs control, customs duties, and visa fees made 
import and export of products more time- and money-consuming, which ac-
celerated the rupture of international production ties. The situation also dete-
riorated owing to the region’s high dependency on power and fuel supply 
from the neighbouring countries, as well as the transit of Russian energy car-
riers via their territory. It led to a deep recession in the industries vital for the 
regions — mechanical engineering, pulp and paper industry, fisheries, etc. 
The population was mostly affected by the economic consequences of the 
region’s exclavisation, although travel across the new Russian-Lithuanian 
border remained free. 
At the second stage (2000s), the exclavity resulted from Euro-Atlantic 
integration extending to the bordering regions, which led to the emergence 
of new customs and border barriers both for the population and economic 
entities of the region. Thus, if previously residents of the Kaliningrad region 
could visit Poland and Lithuania without a visa1 and only with their national 
passports, in 2003, such travel required a special visa (at that point, however, 
people were issued with multi-entry visas for free). Special transit docu-
ments for railway and other land transport were issued for transit to Russia 
and back. In 2005, transit to Russia already required a foreign passport (ex-
cept for air and ferry travel). The isolation from mainland Russia was gradu-
ally increasing and beginning to affect the life of the region’s residents. 
The federal and regional authorities made efforts to mitigate the exclavi-
sation process through diplomatic measures, as well as developing and 
adopting a number of regional and federal legal regulations. The region was 
granted significant preferences in terms of taxes and customs duties, as well 
as transport support (subsidies for air travel, compensations for expenditure 
on gas transit via Belarus and Lithuania, etc.). The establishment of the Yan-
tar free economic zone on the territory of the region in 1991 and the confir-
mation of the special economic zone (SEZ) status in 1996 made it possible to 
import raw materials and intermediate goods and export finished goods duty 
free under the condition that the value added in the region accounted for at 
least 30 % (15 % for electronics and household appliances). As a result, the 
region developed large automotive, electronics, and electro-technical clusters 
based on the import substitution principle [36]. 
Large investments from the state and state-controlled companies were 
made to reduce the region’s energy dependence (the construction of the Ka-
                                                     
1 Since 2002, land transit to the Kaliningrad region via Lithuania has been possible 
with the simplified transit document. 
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liningrad CHPP-2, the commencement of the construction of the Baltic NPP) 
and to develop the its transport opportunities, namely, links to mainland 
Russia (the ferry service in Baltiysk). So, the initiatives of the federal and 
regional authorities became an important factor of regional development. 
The Federal law on SEZ in the Kaliningrad region of October 1, 2006 es-
tablished a ten year transition period (until 2016) without withdrawing cus-
toms privileges for legal persons registered before April 1, 2005, however, 
replacing them with tax concessions for new residents of the SEZ (Federal 
law No. 16 of January 10, 2006) [35]. 
Certain adjustments were made through the introduction of new mecha-
nisms limiting access to the free customs zone regime in the framework of 
the Customs Union (the Agreement on SEZ of June 18, 2010) [32]. In order 
to balance the restrictions, in June 2013 amendments were made to the Ka-
liningrad SEZ Federal Law securing, until April 1, 2016 and at the expense 
of the federal budget, compensations for the customs duties on Customs Un-
ion goods to all SEZ residents registered before April 1, 2006. However, the 
compensation mechanism has not been developed yet and the prospects of 
SEZ residents after 2016 remain unclear. 
Today, businesses enjoying SEZ privileges account for 70 % of the re-
gion’s industrial output, i. e. ¼ of the GRP [26]. The production of SEZ resi-
dents is granted tariff shelter and tax advantages over direct import. At the 
same time, tax concession, which will replace customs privileges after 2016 
can hardly compensate for the exclavity-related costs borne by import substi-
tuting businesses. Most experts believe that reducing economic support op-
portunities for SEZ residents can lead to a decrease in industrial output or 
even closure of certain industries (electronics, food industry, metallurgy, 
woodworking industry, and light industry). 
Economists estimate that, after the law on SEZ becomes ineffective in 
2016, the GRP will drop by 16—19 %, approximately 500 enterprises will 
close down, 45—50 thousand people will lose their jobs, consumer market 
will shrink and, as a result, trade turnover and industry output will decrease 
[10]. According to regional media, some companies have already started to 
move their production facilities to Poland and Lithuania and consider Bela-
rus as such destination [9; 20]. In 2012, the amount of withdrawn foreign in-
vestment exceeded the attracted one by USD 100 mln; a decrease in indus-
trial output was registered over the first five months of 2013 [26]. 
In 2013, in order to ensure the region’s sustainable development and 
mitigate the consequences of exclavity, the federal programme “Socioeco-
nomic Development of the Kaliningrad Region until 2020” was adopted. The 
programme is designed to ensure public support for the region: to eliminate 
excessive administrative barriers in the field of customs administration, to 
consider prolongation of the transition provisions of the SEZ law (2006), to 
introduce a special regime of transporting goods between the Kaliningrad 
region and the rest of the Customs Union, as well as additional tax conces-
sions (corporate income tax, property tax, VAT, etc.) to support individuals 
involved in the priority activities (industrial production, technology devel-
opment, etc.) [13; 35]. According to the governor of the region, the moderni-
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sation of customs facilities envisaged by the programme will also contribute 
to overcoming the consequences of the withdrawal of SEZ privileges and 
will make it possible to lower administrative barriers for business. 
However, exclavity cannot be fully redressed because the compensation 
mechanisms must be coordinated with the governments of neighbouring 
states and their integration alliances. The interests of the exclave as a territo-
rial system relatively isolated from the mainland do not always coincide with 
the interests of other Russian regions and the state in general. The solutions 
aimed at overcoming exclavity result in additional advantages for the region 
over other regions with similar economic specialisation. It results in interre-
gional economic and political conflicts. Moreover, certain advantages lead to 
the emergence of semi-legal businesses. 
So, the concessionary terms of import and customs clearance, which 
functioned in the Kaliningrad region in the early 2000s, did not only contrib-
ute to the rapid increase in car per capita rate (many cars registered in the re-
gion were used elsewhere in Russia), but also led to protests of car manufac-
turers and, later, authorities in other Russian regions — namely, Samara and 
Nizhny Novgorod. An even more serious conflict was related to the attempt 
to strip the Kaliningrad car manufacturer Avtotor of customs concessions for 
foreign knock-down kits, which gave the company exclusive privileges. Un-
der the pressure from the Association of Russian Automakers, Avototor had 
to close the Chery assembly line, which posed serious competitive threat to 
the AvtoVAZ production. Despite significant contribution to the budget and 
an increase in regional industrial output as a result of assembling of Chinese 
cars (more than 35,000 cars were manufactured and sold in 2007), AvtoVAZ 
powerful lobby in high places made Chery and Avtotor abandon their plans 
to jointly build a factory with a capacity of 200—250 cars per year [14; 20]. 
One can suppose that the car cluster project announced in 2013 in the 
framework of public-private partnership against the background of a de-
crease in car production and demand can provoke similar conflicts [15; 25]. 
In some cases, decisions made for the benefit of the country as a whole 
do not take into account the exclave position of the region and adversely af-
fect its population and economy. So, the long-awaited Russia-EU agreement 
on the facilitation of the issuance of visas, which came into effect on June 1, 
2007, resulted in a stricter visa regime for the region’s residents. Instead of a 
free one-year visa for travel to Poland and Lithuania, the residents had to ob-
tain a one-entry visa paying a 35-euro fee. Another example is the applica-
tion of article 15 of the Federal Law on the Procedure of Exiting and Enter-
ing the Russian Federation, which restricts international travel of citizens 
evading obligations imposed by the court or the third party (credit, alimony, 
utility payment debts, etc.). This article restricts the travel of residents of the 
Kaliningrad region to other constituent entities of the Russian Federation 
since it requires crossing the state border [22, с. 18]. 
The side effects of exclavity can be counterbalanced by the region’s 
transport and geographical position (TGP) [19; 24; 36]. The advantages of 
the region’s TGP include its access to the Baltic Sea ensuring an uninhibited 
connection to the Russian North-West (the motorcar and railway facilities in 
A. Sebentsov, M. Zotova 
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Baltiysk), as well as the position at the intersection of the North-South and 
West-East cargo flows. The cases of other world regions show that such 
conditions make it possible to derive maximum benefit from the coastal po-
sition [31]. According to a number of experts, it makes it possible to hope 
for the development of a regional transport cluster, which can be integrated 
later in the transport system of the Baltic region [24]. 
Thus, one of the branches of Pan-European corridor I (I-А, Via Hanseatica) 
should help the Kaliningrad region secure the status of a natural bridge between 
different parts of the common European space — Poland and the Baltics. How-
ever, the due implementation of this project, which suggests designing a special 
tourist route, is complicated not only by the insufficient development of neces-
sary infrastructure, but also by customs and border barriers. 
Another branch of the Pan-European corridor (I-B, Via/Rail Baltica) — a 
railway with a standard European gauge (1, 435 mm), which will connect the 
largest cities of the Baltics with the railway network of Western Europe 
without crossing the external borders of the EU — seems to be more com-
petitive [6]. This project also includes a motorway [28]. In this light, the 
transhipment of cargoes via the port of Klaipeda (40 m t capacity) with fur-
ther transportation by the IX-A Klaipeda — Vilnius route seems to be more 
attractive for potential shippers and investors than the use of the Kaliningrad 
branch of the transport corridor. 
Thus, despite the fact that Kaliningrad (with its total cargo capacity of 
12.7 m t in 2012) is the only Russian ice-free port in the Baltic, its transport 
prospects are unclear. Another threat to the active use of the Kaliningrad 
transport branch in the future is competition with the neighbouring Polish 
ports — those of Gdansk (25 m t) and Gdynia (15 m t), whose hinterland is 
not cut by state borders. 
The correlation between the border position of the Kaliningrad region 
and its exclavity is rather complex. Although exclavity and border position 
are overlapping notions, the compactness of the region causes regional ef-
fects relating to the ubiquitous vicinity of state borders rather than the isola-
tion from mainland Russia [30]. 
Research literature and mass media often view the Kaliningrad region as 
a ‘double periphery’ excluded from the major modernisation processes both 
in the European integration area and the Russian Federation [31]. This issue 
is still open to discussion. The application of the multi-scale approach to 
analysing socioeconomic indices of the Kaliningrad region and other regions 
of the North-Western Federal District (NWFD), as well as the neighbouring 
regions of foreign countries shows that the socioeconomic gradients are in-
significant and the living standards are comparable. 
When compared to the NWFD regions, the Kaliningrad region lags be-
hind only Saint Petersburg and the scarcely populated oil-producing Nenets 
Autonomous Area. The closest characteristics to the Kaliningrad region are 
demonstrated by the Leningrad and Vologda regions, which are considered 
by experts as rapidly developing. A strong point of the Kaliningrad region is 
a ‘younger’ and more balanced age and sex structure of population and mi-
gration attractiveness [16]. 
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Against the background of many NWFD regions and the neighbouring 
regions of Poland and Lithuania, the demographic situation in the Kalinin-
grad region is rather favourable. As a result of positive net migration, since 
the 1990s, the population has been stable (fig. 1). However, life expectancy 
in the region is lower; there are no evident shifts in the morality rate, which 
is indicative of a still high level of social pathology (alcoholism, drug abuse, 
spread of HIV, etc.). The demographic situation in Lithuania is much worse. 
Mass emigration following the accession to the EU and the opening of the 
European labour market alongside natural population decline led to a 13 % 
population decrease. The three counties that border Russia accounted for al-
most a forth of these losses. According to the migration services, young peo-
ple of 20—29 years of age accounted for more than a half of those leaving 
the country. In Poland, the population of the northern regions remains more 
or less stable. The analysis of regional statistics proves that many voivode-
ships and powiats demonstrate slow population growth, which results from 
small natural increase, which compensates for the migration outflow [2]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Population dynamics in the Kaliningrad region and the neighbouring regions 
of Poland and Lithuania in 2002—2012,% [1; 2; 7] 
 
The social situation in the three regions under consideration does not 
show any substantial differences. In 2012, an average salary in the Kalinin-
grad region (PPP) amounted to 716 USD, in the Pomeranian Voivodeship to 
805 USD, in the Klaipeda region to 762 (fig. 2). The food basket cost is 
20—23 % lower in Gdansk than in Kaliningrad or Klaipeda, however, 
Gdansk residents have to pay twice as much as Kaliningraders for petrol, 
utilities, and public transportation. It is cheaper to buy a flat in Kaliningrad, 
and a car in Gdansk or Klaipeda. On average, the Polish are a little bit 
‘richer’ than Russians and Lithuanians, but the Lithuanian regional commu-
nity is less segregated by income than the Polish or Russian ones [8]. 
A. Sebentsov, M. Zotova 
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Fig. 2. Average gross monthly salary in the Kaliningrad region  
and the neighbouring regions of Poland and Lithuania (PPP), 2011 (USD) [1; 2; 5; 7] 
 
As a survey2 of 675 students from 3 universities — the Immanuel Kant 
Baltic Federal University (Kaliningrad), the University of Gdansk (Poland), 
and Klaipeda University (Lithuania) — shows, the subjective assessment of 
one’s financial situation corresponds largely to the objective economic situa-
tion (Table 1). However, Kaliningrad students, as well as Russian population 
in general, are prone to pessimistic views on the prospects of the region: 
55.6 % of IKBFU students believe that, in the near future, the situation in the 
region will remain the same or get worse. Only 34.6 % of students share this 
viewpoint in Gdansk and 18 % in Klaipeda. At the same time, Kaliningraders 
are more optimistic about their future than the regional prospects: 57.9 % are 
sure that they will be able to attain a better standard of living in a short-term 
perspective. In other words, they rely on their own efforts and do not pin 
hopes on the development of Russia as a whole or the region in particular. 
One cannot ignore the stabilisation of retail turnover against the back-
ground of rapidly growing prices of goods and services. At the same time, it 
does not mean poverty or stagnating standards of living. The purchasing 
power of the population and demand for goods and services are increasing, 
                                                     
2 The survey was conducted by the research team of the Immanuel Kant Baltic Fede-
ral University (under the supervision of G.M. Fedorov and E.S. Fidrya), Klaipeda 
University (Eduardas Spiriajevas), and the University of Gdansk (J. Wendt) with the 
help of a questionnaire drawn up by V.A. Kolosov and O.I. Vendina in the frame-
work of a project of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (No 12-06-91052). 
It included questions about the respondents’ command of foreign languages, travel 
experience, their assessment of their families’ welfare and the prospects of the re-
gion, frequency and purposes of travel to the neighbouring countries, attitudes to the 
border regime, migration intentions, and geopolitical views.  
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however, a significant share of purchases is made in the neighbouring coun-
tries, first of all, Poland, where the cost of goods is lower (fig. 3). This con-
clusion was supported by an expert interview held by the authors of the sur-
vey. Among IKBFU students, 61.1 % of respondents visited Poland, 47.6 % 
Lithuania. As to the purpose of travel, 30.2 % mentioned shopping, 54.8 % 
tourism and entertainment, which are also connected with consumption, 
15.9 % visited Lithuania for shopping and 41.3 % for recreation. 
 
Table 1 
 
Respondents’ assessments of their family income, % 
 
Level Gdansk Kaliningrad Klaipeda 
Low 4.1 5.6 1.9 
Below average 16.1 19.8 12.6 
Average 50.2 54 62.1 
Above average 25.3 15.1 19.4 
High 4.1 4 3.4 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Retail turnover in the Kaliningrad region and the neighbouring regions  
of Poland and Lithuania (PPP), 2010 [1; 2; 5; 7] 
 
The regional economy oriented towards substitution and Russian con-
sumer market is fragile and unstable [36]. During the 2008 crisis, the fall in the 
economic indices was more dramatic in the Kaliningrad region than in other 
Russian regions. At the same time, the restoration was also more rapid. 
The economic crisis significantly affected the economies of the bordering 
regions of Lithuania and Poland, which have similar economic specialisations 
focused on cargo transit, port services, mechanical engineering, food industry, 
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amber processing, and recreation. As to industrial output per capital, the Ka-
liningrad region is well ahead of the neighbouring Warmian-Masurian 
voivodeship and is comparable to one of the most developed Polish regions — 
the Pomeranian voivodeship (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
 
Industrial output per capita in the border regions of Poland and Lithuania,  
and the Kaliningrad region, 2011, USD [1—4; 30] 
 
Territory By the national  currency exchange rate 
By purchasing  
power parity 
Russian Federation 9012 13 537 
Kaliningrad region 12 331 18 523 
Poland 9974 15 703 
Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship 6274 9878 
Pomeranian Voivodeship 11 547 18 180 
Lithuania 8012 12 191 
 
The performance of the agricultural industry of the Kaliningrad region is 
close to that of the Polish and Lithuanian neighbours. According to the 
2007—2011 data, the region matches them in terms of cereal production 
(Table 3). The agricultural problems of the region do not relate to low effi-
ciency, but to the curtailment of production and large-scale abandonment of 
agricultural lands, whose areas shrinked almost threefold in 1990—2011. At 
the same time, the Bagrationovsk district, where the major Russia-Poland 
border crossings are situated and a significant part of population is involved 
in cross-border trade, shows lowest cereal productivity (2500 kg/ha against 
the regional average of 3800 kg/ha). 
 
Table 3 
 
Cereal production in the Kaliningrad region and the neighbouring regions  
of Poland and Lithuania, kg/ha [1; 2; 29] 
 
Territory 2002 2010 2011 Average production rate, 2007—2011 
Russian Federation … 1830 2240 2140 
Kaliningrad region 1930 3230 2670 3220 
Poland … 3940 4135 3740 
Warmian-Masurian 
Voivodeship 2800 3540 … 3140 
Pomeranian Voivodeship 3000 3180 … 3290 
Lithuania … 3310 3392 3430 
Klaipeda County 1920 2410 2300 2330 
Tauragė County 2430 2700 2370 2660 
Marijampolė County 3310 3760 3740 3810 
 
Thus, the achieved level of economic development creates essential pre-
requisites for interregional cooperation of equal partners. The reasons behind 
distorted transboundary relations are largely subjective. 
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A serious challenge for the Kaliningrad region is the shadow economy 
exploiting the border position of the region and the privileges of border 
communities. The existing differences between the region, the border coun-
ties of Lithuania, and the Polish voivodeships created the basis for cross-
border business, which makes it possible to make up for the negative effects 
of exclavity. So, at the first stage of Kaliningrad exclavisation, an increase in 
the permeability of the Kaliningrad-Polish border resulted in a dramatic 
growth in cross-border trade. People involved in such activities tried to bene-
fit from the smallest difference in prices of a long list of consumer goods, 
although the key commercial articles were fuel, cigarettes, and alcohol. The 
development of cross-border trade played an important role in the stabilisa-
tion of the socioeconomic situation in the region in the early 1990s, thus en-
suring self-employment of many residents of the border areas of the Kalinin-
grad region. At the second stage of exclavisation, the tightening of the visa 
regime (the introduction of paid one-entry visas for Kaliningraders) dimin-
ished the significance of cross-border trade and forced Kaliningraders out of 
this business. As a result, the scale of cross-border trade, which created a 
considerable number of jobs after the collapse of the USSR and served as a 
source of cheaper goods, was reduced. 
The agreement on local border traffic (LBT) concluded by the govern-
ments of Russia and Poland increased the permeability of the Russian-Polish 
border. Now, residents of the Kaliningrad region can spend up to 30 days in 
a row (but not more than 90 days in 6 month) on the Polish territory with a 
special permit. On the Russian part, the visa-free area includes the whole 
Kaliningrad region (15100 km²); on the Polish one, part of the Warmian-
Masurian and Pomeranian voivodeships (16500 km²), including the city of 
Gdansk. Although the formal reason for obtaining such permit is cross-bor-
der family ties, as well as different social, cultural, and economic connec-
tions, it is evident that the main beneficiaries of LBT are cross-border trad-
ers. If Kaliningraders bring food and toiletry from Poland, the Polish cross 
the border to fill up the tank. According to the Olsztyn Customs Chamber, in 
2012, Polish “tanker” traders transported 160 m l fuel from Russia [34]. 
The analysis of the official regional customs data shows that the number 
of passenger cars crossing the Polish border increased 1.5 times in the first 
half of 2013 in comparison to the similar period of the previous year. Ac-
cording to the Customs Service of Poland and the Eastern Europe Depart-
ment of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approximately 100,000 per-
mits were issued over the first year of LBT functioning, whereas the ex-
pected number of crossings will amount to 6 m by the end of 2013. At the 
same time, the number of Polish citizens visiting the Kaliningrad region ex-
ceeds that of Russians visiting Poland by 45 %. Most Polish visitors are ap-
parently cross-border traders, since, according to the Border Office of the 
Kaliningrad Branch of the Federal Security Service, 80 % of such visitors do 
not spend more than a few hours in the region. 
Unlike the 1990s, the development of cross-border trade does not lead to 
the stabilisation of the socioeconomic situation bur rather results in problems 
for the food industry. The high car ownership rate per capita makes it possible 
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for the citizens to visit the border regions of Poland for consumer purposes 
almost every day. On the Polish territory, in the vicinity of the Kaliningrad 
border, food and clothes supermarkets of such large chains as Tesco and In-
termarché are being rapidly built to accommodate the increasing number of 
Russian shoppers. Thus, although the introduction of LBT has a largely posi-
tive effect, it has caused a dramatic increase in ‘grey market’ imports from Po-
land, as well as problem in the regional customer market. It is indicated by 
numerous appeals of Kaliningrad processing companies and retailers to federal 
and regional structure regarding possible protectionist measures [33]. 
The border position of the Kaliningrad region also entails official pro-
grammes of regional cooperation, many of which are aimed at reducing the ex-
clavity effects and facilitating the development of the border districts of the Ka-
liningrad region and the neighbouring EU states. Alongside numerous bilateral 
cooperation agreements, the Lithuania-Poland-Russia cross-border cooperation 
programme is worth mentioning, which covers the Kaliningrad region and the 
neighbouring subregions (NUTS-3) of Poland and Lithuania. Moreover, the Ka-
liningrad region participates in five Euroregions — Baltic, Neman, Saule, 
Šešupė, Łyna-Ława. Despite the fact that they are implementing a large number 
of projects, most funds are spent on the EU territory and therefore have little ef-
fect on the socioeconomic position of the Kaliningrad region. 
Thus, the economic and geographical position of the Kaliningrad region 
requires certain reconsideration. First of all, one should distinguish between 
the features of evolution and the effect of the exclave and border position of 
the region. Since the collapse of the USSR, the exclavity of the economic 
and geographical position of the region has been steadily increasing, whereas 
the permeability of different sectors of the state border has been changing. 
Although many components of EGP often compensate for the exclavity ef-
fects, one should not overestimate their potential: the exclavity of the Kalin-
ingrad region has a direct effect on the degree and nature of manifestation of 
other components of its economic and geographical position. 
 
The article was written with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic 
Research (RFBR-National Research Centre project No. 12-06-91052). 
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